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ABSTRACT
Executive compensation is increasingly becoming a target by media, shareholders, and
government regulators. Excessive or poorly structured compensation arrangements have been
blamed for the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 and it has been questioned why executives were
being paid out the bonuses and other benefits even though their companies were losing
shareholder value. Agency theory explains part of the problem is due to the separation of
management from ownership. This study investigated the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance in the restaurant industry.
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INTRODCUTION
Executive compensation, how and how much, is increasingly becoming a target by
media, shareholders, and government regulators. It has been questioned why executives are
receiving the bonuses and other benefits even though their companies are losing shareholder
value. Part of the problem is due to the separation of management from ownership. Managers
have incentives to pursue self-serving goals that may not maximize the shareholder value. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) emphasized that managers will make operating decisions that maximize his
utility in the form of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. Because the shareholders do not often
have enough information regarding the managers’ activities, it is difficult to verify whether
managers are acting in the best interest of the shareholders. It has been theorized that using
equity-based compensation ties executives’ wealth to the stock price, therefore, motivates
executives to align their own interests with the shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). However, Walker (2010) indicated that using stock options has contributed to the shift in
executives’ focus on short-term gains, rather than longer-term outlook. Further, Mehran (1995)
stated that there is little empirical evidence on whether corporations using more equity-based
compensation perform better.
Agency theory seeks to determine most efficient contract governing the managershareholder relationship. Specifically, the question is a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., salaries)

more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., ownership, stock options) affecting firm
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).
According to Sturman (2001) service industries provided lowest average salary, shortterm bonuses, and long-term bonuses among all the industries tallied to their executives. In
addition, a recent study reported that restaurant industry used more behavior-oriented
compensation than outcome-oriented compensation (Barber, Ghiselli, & Deale, 2006). As agency
theory indicates, using short-term incentive compensation may not align managerial interests
with shareholder interests. Prior studies examining the executive compensation in the restaurant
industry focused on single reward, either pay and performance (Kim & Gu, 2005; Madanoglu &
Karadag, 2008) or managerial ownership and performance (Park & Jang, 2010). However, the
executives usually are compensated through multiple rewards such as stock options, salary, and
bonuses (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Financial performance is widely used as an indicator of business performance. It is
generally suggested that a compensation system based on managerial performance would be a
better solution because perfect monitoring may be impossible or too expensive (Kim & Gu,
2005). Therefore, developing appropriate performance measures and interpreting the outcomes
are central to the issue of organizational control. Profitability is the most commonly used basis
for defining success, however; found to be short run oriented measure (Phillips, 1999). Although,
economic value added (EVA) was proposed as an overall measure of financial performance that
is intended to represent a firm’s true performance (Lee & Kim, 2009), Otley (1999) argued that it
is particularly weak in measuring and monitoring the means by which managers have adopted to
achieve their overall objectives. In order to reflect both accounting performance measures and
shareholders’ future expectations on firms Tobin’s q has been employed to explain a number of
diverse corporate phenomena (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). It is defined as the ratio of the
market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets; it reflects both accounting
performance measures and investors’ future expectation on firms.
The purpose of this study was threefold: first, to investigate the relationship between
executive compensation and restaurant firm performance; second, to investigate which form of
compensation, or combination, contributes more to the firm performance; and third, to determine
whether level of compensation affects firm performance. This study adds value as it uses
different methodology, panel data, and uses a larger sample with a longer time period than prior
studies. In addition, this study includes additional determinants indicated by the literature to gain
better insights into the relationship.
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The sample for this study is the publicly traded restaurant companies in the U.S. The ten
year (1999-2009) annual financial and executive compensation data on those firms is obtained
from COMPUSTAT database.
Overall firm performance was measured using a modified version of the Tobin’s q
following Chung and Puritt formula (1994). Chung and Puritt (1994) approximation of Tobin’s q

was chosen for its simplicity and data availability, yet the model found to explain at least 96.6%
of the variability in Tobin’s q. Approximate q defined as:
approximate Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA
(1)
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of common stock shares
outstanding, PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the
value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets, plus the book value of the
firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the book value of the total assets of the firm.
A regression model (see equation 2) was adopted in this study to investigate the
relationship between firm performance and executive compensation. Firm performance is the
dependent variable and the independent variables are described below. Size was included as a
controlling variable to reflect the size effects of the firm and was measured using total revenue of
the firm.
FPit = β0 + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit + εit
(i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T)

Variable
FP
S
B
RS
SO
NON
OC
TC
Size

(2)

Table 1
Variable Description
Description
Firm Performance, Tobin’s Q
Salary
Bonus
Restricted Stock Grants
Stock Options (Fair Market Value)
Non-equity Compensation
Other Compensation
Total Compensation
Size, Total Revenue

Panel data methodology was chosen for this study as pooling regression ignores the
individual firm effects (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005 2005). Himmelberg et al. (1999) emphasized
that environment in which compensation contracts take place differs across firms in both
observable and unobservable ways.
Fixed-effects model
FPit = (αi + uit) + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit
(3)
Random-effects model
FPit = αi + β1Sit + β2Bit + β3RSit + β4SOit + β5NONit + β6OCit + β7TCit + β8Sizeit + (uit + vit) (4)
where αi is the unknown intercept for each firm, and uit is the error term.
Two statistical tests were performed to identify which empirical methodology, pooling,
random effect, or fixed effect regression, is most suitable. Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test
(Breusch & Pagan, 1980) of the random effect model and the Hausman specification test to
compare the fixed effect and random effect models (Hausman, 1978).
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